estimated a simultaneous equation model. The unit of observation was the pharmacy ZIP Code per quarter-year. All values were adjusted to 2016 US dollars using the prescription drug consumer price index. 14 There are currently three primary naloxone delivery systems (injection, auto-injection, and intranasal). Even though the autoinjection and intranasal systems are most likely to receive OTC status, we included all available formulations and delivery systems in our model. The reason for this is that the auto-injection and intranasal delivery systems have only been on the market since 2014 and 2015, respectively, and therefore, by themselves, would provide very little information upon which to estimate our model.
| Demand function
The demand equation for naloxone was modeled as a function of the out-of-pocket price paid by consumers at the pharmacy, consumer income, other consumer demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that may be associated with the quantity of naloxone they are willing and able to purchase at any given price, the severity of the opioid use disorder epidemic in the area, local pharmacy naloxone access regulations, and other regional characteristics. 
| Price function
The US pharmaceutical manufacturing industry for specific therapeutic markets is more accurately characterized as an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market. 15 As such, we estimated a price equation similar to that of Keeler et al, 16 which better reflects the supply side of an oligopolistic market. The naloxone price equation
was modeled as a function of the cost of production, distribution, and selling; variations in the price elasticity of demand over time; and market competition. The binary variables indicating the availability of the auto-injection and intranasal naloxone delivery systems were also included to control for their potential effect on market competitiveness and the elasticity of demand.
| Identification
To control for the endogeneity in a two-equation system and ensure that the system is identified, each equation must contain at least one unique exogenous variable that is correlated with the endogenous right-hand-side variable, but not the residual, in the other equation.
These "extra" exogenous variables serve as instruments for the endogenous right-hand-side variable. Consumer demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that are associated with their preferences for naloxone at any given price do not belong in the supply function from a theoretical standpoint, and therefore, those measures were excluded from the price equation. For the same reason, the production cost and market competition measures were excluded from the demand equation. Therefore, our simultaneous system of equations was likely overidentified, indicating that unique estimates for all parameters could be calculated. As an additional test of overidentification, we estimated a reduced-form generalized method of moments equation and calculated Hansen's J statistic using Stata's overid command; the results indicated that the instruments are valid and the equation is overidentified. Other local characteristics, such as the political environment around naloxone distribution and influence of community members' opinions, were controlled for using state fixed effects and Rural-Urban
| Data and measures
Commuting Area (RUCA) codes to identify the degree of rurality associated with each ZIP Code. 19 RUCA codes combine the Bureau of Census' "urbanized area" and "urban cluster" definitions with information on work commutes to create a more refined measure of community isolation.
The cost of naloxone production, distribution, and selling was controlled for using the average producer price index value for pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing overall, by quarter-year. 20 The number of naloxone manufacturers in the quarter-year was included in the price equation as a measure of market competitiveness. An exponential time trend was included in the price equation to reflect changes in the price elasticity of demand over time, as well as technological improvements that could have increased the efficiency with which manufacturers were able to produce naloxone. Finally, binary variables indicating the availability of the auto-injection and intranasal naloxone delivery systems were included in both the demand and price equations due to their potential effects on demand and supply. cording to the fit of the data. 21 The modified Parks test was used as a guide to choosing the appropriate variance structure (ie, family), and the Pearson Correlation, Pregibon Link, and Modified Hosmer and
| Analysis
Lemeshow tests were used to inform the decision of which mean (ie, link) function was most appropriate. 21 The opioid overdose death rate was suppressed for regions with fewer than 10 reported overdose deaths. 18 Given that we know the reason for the missingness of observations in this variable and had observed variables that were strong predictors of the probability of the missingness (ie, the RUCA code and state fixed effects), we used inverse probability weighting within a GLM framework to predict and replace these missing values prior to the inclusion of the opioid overdose death rate in the GSEM. 22 The average missingness per quarter-year ranged from 19 percent to 41 percent, with a mean of 26 percent across all time periods.
| Prediction of change in quantity of naloxone sales
Our prediction of the change in the quantity of naloxone sold in pharmacies following a conversion to OTC was based on our estimated own-price elasticity of demand for naloxone, and estimates obtained from the literature regarding (a) the difference between the out-of-pocket price for medications covered by insurance and the price paid for those medications after a change in prescribing status to OTC, (b) the own-price elasticity of demand for nicotine replacement therapies following their conversion to OTC, and (c) the estimated effect that the conversion to OTC had on the quantity of nicotine replacement therapies demanded. Nicotine replacement therapies were chosen because they are the only other substance use disorder pharmacotherapy to have experienced a change from prescription-only to OTC status in the United States, and the change to OTC status created an entirely new OTC market with potential public health benefits, 23 as would naloxone.
The fact that our data failed to capture 20 percent of pharmacies is a limitation; however, according to the data distributor, pharmacies that are not included in the data are typically independent or associated with relatively small chains, and these pharmacies may be less likely to dispense naloxone. [26] [27] [28] [29] The pharmacy ZIP Code serving as a proxy for a customer's geographic location is a limitation;
however, since naloxone must be purchased in-person, even under a standing order, we believe this to be a reasonable assumption. The CDC's compressed mortality file was only available at the county level, and data were suppressed for regions with fewer than 10 overdose deaths; however, these observations were accounted for using a proven technique to address missing-data bias. 22 We were unable to determine whether ZIP Codes in states that allowed local standing orders actually had one in place. Similarly, for ZIP Codes in states with statewide standing orders we were unable to determine whether pharmacies were actually adhering to the standing order. We were unable to measure the production, distribution, and selling costs for naloxone specifically, but were able to include the producer price index for pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing as a proxy. We do not have sufficient data to forecast the impact that a conversion of naloxone to OTC would have on opioid overdose education and naloxone distribution by harm reduction agencies, for example, information on the likelihood that persons who are unable or unwilling to purchase naloxone at a higher out-of-pocket price would obtain it by other means.
| RE SULTS
Descriptive statistics by ZIP Code/quarter-year over the observation period are presented in Code/quarter-year observations that contained a recorded naloxone pharmacy sale were associated with a metropolitan area, and the mean opioid overdose death rate in the associated counties in the prior year was 9.71/100 000 persons. The national opioid overdose death rate over this period ranged from just under 7/100 000 to over 13/100 000 persons.
| Demand function
The results from the estimated demand function are presented in Table 2 . The coefficient estimate for the log of the out-of-pocket 
| Price function
The results from the price function are also displayed in Table 2 .
The number of naloxone manufacturers was negatively associated with the out-of-pocket pharmacy price; specifically, each addi- 
| Prediction of change in quantity demanded
Applying the own-price elasticity of demand for naloxone (−0.27) to the observed out-of-pocket price increases associated with OTC product conversions in Maryland (2 percent to 233 percent), 24 and the estimated demand increases for nicotine patches and gum (78 percent and 180 percent, respectively), 16 we predict an increase in naloxone sales of 15 percent to 77 percent using the estimated demand increase for nicotine patches, and 117 to 179 percent using the estimate for nicotine gum (Table 3 , Figure 1 ). Predicted 19 codes 4 (primary flow within a "large urban cluster" = 10 000-49 999 persons) through 6 (primary flow 10%-30% to a "large urban cluster"). b RUCA codes 7 (primary flow within a "small urban cluster" = 2500-9999 persons) through 10 (rural = primary flow outside an urban cluster or area). c RUCA codes 1 (primary flow within an "urbanized area" >9999) through 3
(primary flow 10%-30% to an "urbanized area").
TA B L E 1 (Continued) nicotine gum (33 percent), our estimated own-price elasticity of demand for naloxone, and the relevant estimated effects of OTC conversions on demand for nicotine patches and gum, we predict a 71 to 171 percent increase in total naloxone pharmacy sales.
| D ISCUSS I ON
Our primary outcome of interest was the own-price elasticity of demand for naloxone pharmacy sales. We found that the demand for tions. 31 The relatively large own-price elasticities of demand for the OTC nicotine replacement therapies may be the result of the marginal consumer being less committed to smoking cessation, and thus more responsive to price changes, than those who seek the prescription products. Similarly, the marginal OTC consumer may feel there are more substitutes for the OTC products, including those that are prescription-only, whereas prescription-only consumers may have already tried the OTC products, with limited success.
Applying the estimated own-price elasticity of demand for naloxone to estimates from the literature regarding changes in price and demand around OTC conversion, we predict that naloxone In sensitivity analyses we estimated that even at a price increase of 233 percent for naloxone, the increase in demand associated with OTC would have to fall below 68 percent, or the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of demand would have to increase to −0.34, before total pharmacy sales would decline. The own-price elasticity of demand was robust to varying the instruments in the demand and price functions. Moreover, theoretically, we would not expect the elasticity of demand for naloxone to change much following a move to OTC given that it is a life-saving drug for which there are no substitutes, and, at a current retail price of $150 ($18.75/mg) for two intranasal devices, 32 we do not expect it to become a significantly larger proportion of the average consumer's budget, even if most insurers choose not to cover the drug. Of course, the larger the increase in demand, the more robust the findings are to increases 
